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Abstract
Why do young firms pay less? Using confidential microdata from the US Census Bureau,
we find lower earnings among workers at young firms. However, we argue that such mea-
surement is likely subject to worker and firm selection. Exploiting the two-sided panel nature
of the data to control for relevant dimensions of worker and firm heterogeneity, we uncover a
positive and significant young-firm pay premium. Furthermore, we show that worker selec-
tion at firm birth is related to future firm dynamics, including survival and growth. We tie our
empirical findings to a simple model of pay, employment, and dynamics of young firms.
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1 Introduction
Young firms account for 11 percent of US employment and are credited with a disproportionate
share of total job creation.1 Given the importance of young firms in generating jobs, extensive
literature has focused on the employment dynamics of new businesses. However, much less is
known about the quality of jobs at young firms. Previous work has documented that workers
earn less at young firms (Brown and Medoff, 2003) and has offered two competing explanations
for this correlation. The first explanation pertains to preferences: employees at young firms may
enjoy nonpecuniary benefits such as autonomy and flexibility in lieu of monetary compensation
(Hurst and Pugsley, 2011). The second explanation pertains to constraints: credit limits may lead
young firms to offer lower starting wages (Michelacci and Quadrini, 2009) and asset-poor workers
to opt for lower-paying but more readily available jobs at young firms (Dinlersoz et al., 2019).
In this paper, we pursue a third and entirely different explanation for low pay at young firms:
simultaneous worker and firm selection.
To uncover the relative pay of young firms in the presence of worker and firm selection, we
follow a theory-guided empirical approach. We first present a simple model of the labor market,
in which young firms, on average, employ lower-ability workers (“worker selection”), have lower
productivity (“firm selection”), and have a higher probability of exiting the market that leads them
to pay a premium. We then put these model predictions to the test in the data. Using administra-
tive linked employer-employee records from the US Census Bureau that span almost two decades,
we track millions of worker careers across young and old firms. The two-sided panel nature of
the data allows us to identify permanent worker and firm pay heterogeneity separately from the
firm age-pay component. Without additional controls, we confirm lower pay at young firms, in
line with previous survey data evidence by Brown and Medoff (2003). However, controlling for
time-invariant and time-varying worker and firm characteristics, we find a positive and signifi-
cant young-firm pay premium. We also show that worker selection at firm birth is related to future
firm dynamics, including survival rates and employment growth. We tie these empirical findings
back to our model and alternative theories of pay, employment, and dynamics of young firms.
Previous research on the young-firm pay premium has faced two major challenges. The first
challenge is related to data availability. Obviously, a study of young firms’ pay policies requires
1See Decker et al. (2014) for a comprehensive survey of the role of young businesses in the US economy. Haltiwanger
et al. (2013) discuss patterns in job creation and exit rates across firm age groups. Young firms are also important drivers
of innovation and productivity growth (Acemoglu et al., 2018), resource reallocation (Foster et al., 2008), and trends in
business dynamism (Decker et al., 2018).
2
a reliable measure of firm age. However, measurement of firm age is often problematic because
many datasets do not distinguish between establishment and firm births, or between new firm for-
mation and changes in ownership or legal structure. This distinction is critical because the major-
ity of jobs created in new establishments belong to incumbent firms (Haltiwanger et al., 2013). The
second challenge is methodological. Going back to the seminal contribution by Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis (1999, henceforth AKM), it is now well understood that permanent heterogeneity
among both workers and firms plays a prominent role in explaining empirical pay dispersion.
When using only cross-sectional data, however, it is impossible to distinguish between high-pay
workers, high-pay firms, and firm-age-specific pay policies in the presence of selection. We over-
come both of these challenges by estimating an augmented model in the spirit of AKM using
microdata based on two confidential databases from the US Census Bureau: linked employer-
employee data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics program (LEHD) and busi-
ness register data from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). To the best of our knowledge,
we provide the first estimates of the young-firm pay premium while accounting for worker and
firm selection in the US.
Before launching into our empirical analysis, we present a simple theoretical model of worker
and firm selection to structure our analysis and aid interpretation of our findings. In the model,
workers of different ability are matched to firms of different productivity and age subject to search
frictions. When a new firm is started, it receives a productivity draw and recruits workers. But
instead of attracting a representative sample of job applicants, firms recruit individuals of a single
random ability level. A notable feature of our model is that future productivity of a firm, and
hence its survival and growth prospects, may depend on initial workforce composition. Before
production occurs, young firms learn about their cost structure, leading some to exit and expose
their workers to unemployment risk. Bargained earnings in this environment are log-additively
separable into three terms: a worker component, a firm component, and a positive young-firm
pay premium that compensates workers for higher exit risk.
Guided by our theoretical model, we turn to measuring the young-firm pay premium in the
data. First, confirming previous survey data evidence by Brown and Medoff (2003), we find that
young firms up to three years old pay 30.7 log points lower earnings compared to older firms.2
However, we argue that these estimates are subject to worker and firm selection. To address the
2We find consistent results when repeating our analysis using a more narrow age range of 0–1 years to define young
firms and under a more gradual definition of firm age using two-year bins from birth to 20 or more years old.
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issue of selection, we follow recent work employing the two-way fixed effects framework devel-
oped by AKM.3 This approach relies on following individuals across employers over time in order
to separately identify worker and firm fixed effects in earnings. We augment this framework with
indicators for firm age groups, which are identified by tracing individual firms as they grow older.
We operationalize variants of this augmented AKM equation on our linked employer-employee
data by repeatedly estimating the young-firm pay premium with sequentially added controls (Al-
tonji et al., 2005; Oster, 2019).
Our first main result is that the apparent pay penalty at young firms turns into a positive and
significant young-firm pay premium after controlling for relevant dimensions of worker and firm
heterogeneity. Adding worker fixed effects alone accounts for more than two-thirds of the orig-
inal point estimate, resulting in a young-firm pay penalty of 8.7 log points. Put differently, by
following workers over time, we learn that workers employed at young firms are permanently
low-paid, even when employed at older firms. Adding additional time-varying worker controls,
including education-specific age profiles, the young-firm pay penalty decreases further in magni-
tude to 7.8 log points, consistent with young firms’ hiring younger and less-educated workers. In
our preferred specification, which adds firm fixed effects, we estimate a moderate but significant
young-firm pay premium of 0.7 log points. We interpret the increase in the point estimate after
inclusion of firm fixed effects as the pool of young firms being skewed toward permanently low-
paying firms. Following the pay policy over a firm’s life cycle reveals a negative relation between
firm age and pay. We conclude from these findings that simultaneous worker and firm selection
mask the true young-firm pay premium.
It is well documented that most young firms are born small and that firm size has a significant
life cycle component (Bartelsman et al., 2005). At the same time, there is still significant variation
in size conditional on age (Pugsley et al., 2018). Consequently, we investigate whether the positive
young-firm pay premium could be confounding firm age and size. To this end, we add controls
for firm size to our empirical model. In the raw data, firm employment significantly mediates
the cross-sectional relation between firm age and pay. Among employers with the same number
of workers, young firms pay 13.1 log points less than old firms. However, when controlling for
worker and firm heterogeneity as before, we find a positive and significant premium of 1.7 log
3Variants of the AKM methodology have been fruitfully employed in a number of contexts, including the sources of
earnings heterogeneity (AKM; Abowd et al., 1999b, 2002; Card et al., 2013, 2016; Alvarez et al., 2018; Song et al., 2019;
Bonhomme et al., 2019), teacher-classroom assignments (Burke and Sass, 2013), chief executive officers’ effect on firm
performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), and the formation of bank-firm loan relationships (Gao et al., 2017).
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points paid by young firms. This shows that firm age is a pay-relevant characteristic that is distinct
from firm size. After accounting for the latter, we find a larger young-firm pay premium.
Our second main result is that initial workforce composition is significantly related to future
dynamics of young firms. To arrive at this conclusion, we first compute mean estimated AKM
worker fixed effect estimates among the workforce of every firm over time. We find substantial
variation in mean worker fixed effects across firms and a clear pattern across firm age groups.
Average worker fixed effects are 17.6 log points below the population average at firms 0–1 years
old, but around the population average at firms 8–13 years old, and 17.7 log points above the
population average at firms with 16–17 years old, before declining again for the oldest age groups.
We then show that worker selection and firm dynamics are closely related. While most firms
initially hire low-fixed-effect workers and exit within a couple of years, newly established firms
that survive for 10 or more years start with workers with significantly higher permanent pay
components. We formalize this finding in a regression framework with additional worker and
firm controls and confirm that firms with higher worker fixed effects among their initial workforce
are significantly more likely to survive and grow in the future.
Guided by our theory, we interpret AKM worker fixed effects as proxying for unobserved
worker ability. Through the lens of our model, worker talent is scarce and few firms are lucky
enough to assemble a high-quality workforce. Hiring workers of higher ability is doubly benefi-
cial in this environment. On the one hand, it shields those employers from cost shocks and po-
tential firm exit by increasing current output. On the other hand, initial worker ability also feeds
positively into future firm productivity, leading to higher growth at those employers. While this
story parsimoniously explains all of our empirical patterns, our results leave room for alternative
explanations, including reverse causality. In such an alternative story, some firms face inherently
higher survival and growth prospects. As a result, they have a higher propensity to hire high-
ability workers, possibly due to production complementarities between worker and firm types.
But one would expect such a theory to imply strong match components in labor demand and con-
sequently pay, for which we find little evidence. We conclude that the human capital of young
firms is an important predictor of young-firm dynamics.
We supplement our analysis with several robustness tests. First, we revisit the hypothesis that
young firms offer steeper tenure-earnings profiles (Michelacci and Quadrini, 2009). To separate
the mean from the trend effects of young firms, we follow Schmieder (2013) and restrict our sam-
ple to only the first quarter of each worker-firm match, resulting in a slightly higher young-firm
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pay premium of 2.6 log points in our preferred specification. When we control for worker tenure
interacted with a young-firm indicator, we find that—consistent with Michelacci and Quadrini
(2009)—earnings are more backloaded at young firms, which are, on average, more credit con-
strained (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). However, tenure-earnings profiles are actually flatter at
young firms when controlling for worker and firm heterogeneity. Thus, to the extent that credit
constraints are operative among young firms, rationing seems to occur on the extensive margin.
Second, to probe the generality of our findings, we reestimate our main specification for the
subpopulations of college-educated workers and those in high-technology sectors. While we still
find selection to be important, the young-firm pay premium is also lower for these subpopulations
in line with our theory. This is so plausibly because these workers have higher bargaining power
(Cahuc et al., 2006) and face lower employer exit risk (Agarwal and Gort, 1996, 2002).
Finally, we perform a battery of diagnostic tests that lend support to our augmented AKM
specification. Specifically, we build on Card et al. (2013) to argue in favor of log-additive separa-
bility of the earnings equation and provide evidence against endogenous mobility based on drift
or transitory components of the error term. We also show that our results are robust to different
sources of worker mobility, including their previous employer status.
Related Literature. Our paper contributes to three strands of the literature. The first strand we
contribute to is concerned with the relative pay of young employers. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our paper is the first to estimate the young-firm pay premium while accounting for worker
and firm selection in the US, where prior work has been confined to survey data evidence or firm-
level analyses. The seminal reference is from Brown and Medoff (2003), who collected information
on employer age in a special supplement to the Survey of Consumers that had around 1,000 re-
spondents. They noted that the positive gradient between firm age and pay in the raw data turns
insignificant or negative when controlling for worker characteristics, including education, experi-
ence, tenure, race, gender, marital status, and occupation. Their finding challenged conventional
wisdom, based on previous evidence by Dunne and Roberts (1990), who used the Annual Survey
of Manufactures, that older employers pay more, even after controlling for establishment size,
industry, and region. Other early works that drew similar conclusions include Davis and Halti-
wanger (1991), Doms et al. (1997), and Troske (1998). Brown and Medoff (2003) called attention
to the important issue of worker sorting across firms. But they were constrained by their small
sample size and cross-sectional nature of their data, making it impossible to distinguish between
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worker and firm selection, and between selection on observables and unobservables in relation to
the young-firm pay premium. This is an important omission given recent evidence of assortative
matching between workers and firms in the US labor market (Lamadon et al., 2019). Indeed, we
find that in our data most of the cross-sectional young-firm pay penalty is explained by perma-
nent, unobserved worker heterogeneity.
A handful of prior studies have estimated the young-firm pay premium using linked employee-
employer data from Europe. An inconsistent picture emerges from these studies due to differences
in contexts and methods. For Sweden, for example, Heyman (2007) finds a weak positive rela-
tionship between firm age and pay using three years of cross-sectional data, while Nyström and
Elvung (2014) find mixed results using a propensity score matching approach. For Denmark, Bur-
ton et al. (2018) find a pay premium at young firms in a specifications with worker matching based
on age, gender, education, firm size, prior job, and prior earnings. For Germany, Brixy et al. (2007)
find an 8 percent young-establishment pay penalty in a cross-sectional study, while Schmieder
(2013) finds a 10 percent pay premium after controlling for worker and firm fixed effects. Finally,
using a 1 percent random sample of employees in the United Kingdom, Adrjan (2018) finds that
young firms pay a small premium for new hires.
One benefit of our approach lies in estimating the young-firm pay premium while accounting
for unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity, which have been shown to matter empirically by
many studies since AKM. Yet few works have applied this insight to the study of young firms.
We augment their classical two-way fixed effects framework by allowing for firm age-pay profiles
under the assumption that they remain constant after a certain firm age. In doing so, we provide
the first selection-corrected estimates of the young-firm pay premium for the US.
Perhaps the paper closest to ours is Schmieder (2013), which applies a similar AKM method-
ology to a 2 percent random sample of German administrative data. While the paper documents
a pay premium at younger single-establishment firms in Germany, consistent with our results for
the US, there are several notable differences. First, our paper focuses on the sorting of workers into
young firms and its relation to firm dynamics, which we formalize in a simple model of two-sided
selection. Schmieder (2013), on the other hand, is primarily concerned with evidence of upward-
slowing labor supply curves in relation to existing monopsony theories of monopsony. Second,
without worker and firm fixed effects, Schmieder (2013) documents different establishment age-
pay and establishment size-pay relationships than what has been found in the US, pointing toward
unique characteristics of the German labor market in this context. Finally, an advantage of our ap-
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proach vis-à-vis Schmieder (2013) and prior work on the US is that we track a much larger sample,
consisting of millions of unique workers and hundreds of thousands of unique firms.
The second strand of literature we contribute to is concerned with theories of who works at
young firms and why. Existing work has proposed two reasons for lower pay at young firms. The
first reason pertains to preferences. Workers at young firms, like entrepreneurs, may enjoy non-
pecuniary benefits (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1992; Hamilton, 2000;
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011, 2017; Catherine, 2019) or have
a preference for working at young firms (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; Roach and Sauermann,
2015). The second explanation pertains to constraints. Credit limits may lead young firms to offer
lower starting wages (Azariadis, 1988; Michelacci and Quadrini, 2009; Guiso et al., 2013; Moser et
al., 2019) and asset-poor workers to accept low-paying jobs (Herkenhoff et al., 2018; Herkenhoff,
forthcoming; Dinlersoz et al., 2019). We pursue simultaneous worker and firm selection as a third
and entirely different explanation for low pay at young firms. Contrary to the premise of much
previous work, we find that after controlling for appropriate dimensions of worker and firm het-
erogeneity, the young-firm pay penalty actually turns into a positive young-firm pay premium.
Thus, no additional economic justification is required to explain why individuals work at young
firms.
The third strand of literature we contribute to studies worker and firm dynamics. The clas-
sical firm dynamics model by Hopenhayn (1992) features no between-firm pay differences due
to the assumption of competitive labor markets, making it an unsatisfactory point of departure
for our analysis. Conversely, many seminal models of wage determination such as Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) do not feature any meaningful firm dynamics. A small number of papers study
frictional wage dispersion with endogenous firm dynamics (Kaas and Kircher, 2015; Gavazza et
al., 2018; Engbom, 2019; Gouin-Bonenfant, 2019). Unfortunately, none of these papers allow for
worker heterogeneity, which we find to be important for the young-firm pay premium. Although
a quantitative general-equilibrium framework is beyond the scope of our paper, we develop a sim-
ple model of the labor market to guide our analysis. A notable feature of our framework is that
future productivity of a firm, and hence its survival and growth prospects, may depend on initial
workforce composition—a prediction for which we find strong empirical support. In contempo-
raneous work, Choi et al. (2019) hypothesize that organizational capital may be embodied in a
firm’s founding members. While they do not study the role of worker and firm selection vis-à-vis
the young-firm pay premium, we argue that our empirical findings are consistent with theirs.
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2 Why Do Young Firms Pay Less?
In this section, we present a theoretical model of worker and firm selection. The goal is to provide
a simple framework that allows us to interpret our main empirical findings in light of this theory.
2.1 A Model of Worker and Firm Selection
Consider a two-period economy with time indexed by t ∈ {1, 2}. The economy is populated by
two types of agents, a fixed unit mass of heterogeneous workers and a mass of heterogeneous
firms. We first describe the two types of agents in the economy, outline the timing, then discuss
how matches are formed and how pay is set.
Workers. Workers differ in their ability θ. At any time, they are either employed or unemployed.
Employed workers consume some labor income wt that depends on their own ability as well as
the productivity and age of their employer. The unemployed consume an exogenous amount bθ,
for some b > 0, from home production. Workers have linear period consumption utility.
Firms. Firms differ in their productivity pt ∼ Gt(·) and age group at ∈ {young, old}. New firms
can be created in the beginning of a period by paying an entry cost in exchange for a produc-
tivity draw. After entering and recruiting lθ workers of ability θ before production, young firms
learn their operating cost c ∼ O(·) as in Jovanovic (1982). At this point, firms choose between
either paying the cost and continuing operations or shutting down, which results in an ex-ante
probability of exit xt(pt, {lθ}θ) > 0. Continuing firms produce output according to the technology
y(pt, {lθ}θ) = pt
´
lθθdθ. Importantly, a firm’s future productivity depends on the average ability
of its initial workforce, θ, through the function p2(p1, θ), which is increasing in both arguments.
Timing. At the beginning of period 1, all workers are unemployed and there are no old firms.
New firms are created with idiosyncratic productivity and match with the unemployed. At this
point, worker-firm bargaining and home production occurs. Next, young firms learn about their
cost and decide between exiting and continuing. Exiting firms send their workers back into un-
employment. Continuing firms produce output and pay their employees. At the beginning of
period 2, employed and unemployed workers enter from the previous period. Continuing firms
are classified as old and a set of new firms enter as young. Firms hire unemployed workers, bar-
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gaining occurs, and home production is realized. Finally, young firms learn about their cost and
some young firms exit, output is produced, and the employed are paid.
Matching. In both periods, firms and unemployed workers meet in a labor market characterized
by search frictions, which we think of as capturing incomplete information, adjustment costs, or
idiosyncratic mobility shocks. New firms (in periods 1 and 2) and old firms (in period 2) are
randomly assigned a worker type θ. They then compete with other firms for the uθ,t unemployed
workers in a market specific to that worker type by choosing a recruitment intensity.4 A firm that
posts vθ,t vacancies subject to convex increasing costs φ(vθ,t) hires hθ,t(vθ,t) = uθ,tvθ,t/Vθ,t workers,
where Vθ,t =
´
vθ,t(p)dGt(p) denotes aggregate vacancies posted by all firms in the market.
Pay Determination. Frictions in the labor market imply that there are rents to be shared between
matched workers and firms. We assume that pay in both periods is set through intraperiod bar-
gaining that depends on worker ability, firm productivity, and firm age.5 Specifically, the pay
of a worker with ability θ employed at a firm with productivity p and age a in period t solves
wt (θ, p, a) = arg maxw C (w; θ, p, a)
β J (w; θ, p, a)1−β, where C(w; θ, p, a) is the expected surplus of
a worker paid w, J(w; θ, p, a) is the expected surplus of a firm paying w, and β ∈ (0, 1) denotes
workers’ bargaining weight. Appendix A demonstrates that the solution to the bargaining prob-
lem results in the following model earnings equation:
ln (wt (θ, p, a)) = ln (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
"worker fixed effect"
+ ln (βp + (1− β) b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
"firm fixed effect"
+ 1 [a = young] ln
 βp + (1−β)b1−xt(p,{lθ}θ)
βp + (1− β) b

︸ ︷︷ ︸
"young-firm pay premium"
. (1)
The model earnings equation (1) is log-additively separable into three terms: a “worker fixed
effect” that depends only on worker ability, a “firm fixed effect” that depends on firm productivity,
workers’ outside options and their bargaining power, and a “young-firm pay premium.”
2.2 Key Theoretical Predictions
We provide further details of the model and its solution in Appendix A. Here, we outline five
key theoretical predictions about the pay, employment, and dynamics of young firms. The first
4Our framework could accommodate job-to-job transitions without changing the main insight.
5Consistent with our model featuring a finite number of periods, we adopt a static bargaining protocol so as to not
conflate firm age with time in the model. Exploiting the linearity of the production function across worker types allows
us to solve for the bargaining solution separately by worker type.
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prediction concerns the heterogeneity of pay across workers and firms:
Prediction 1. Higher-ability workers command proportionately higher pay at any given firm, and higher-
productivity firms pay proportionately more to any given worker.
While in a frictional labor market workers are paid below their marginal product, Prediction
1 states that both worker and firm characteristics enter into earnings equation (1). The existence
of worker and firm pay components is a notable departure from the competitive-markets bench-
mark in which all individuals get awarded their marginal product, regardless of where they work.
Although it is impossible to disentangle these pay components using just cross-sectional data, we
will demonstrate that following workers and firms over time allows us to separately identify them.
The second prediction concerns the relative pay of young versus old firms:
Prediction 2. Young firms pay a premium to workers relative to otherwise identical old firms.
The young-firm pay premium mentioned in Prediction 2 reflects the compensation that work-
ers receive for unemployment risk due to the higher exit probability of young firms. In anticipa-
tion of forgone consumption from future unemployment when starting at a young firm, workers
bargain for higher pay. In the data, the young-firm pay premium may be masked by the con-
volution of worker and firm selection, which we describe in detail below. We can uncover the
true firm-age pay premium, however, by controlling for other observed as well as unobserved
dimensions of worker and firm heterogeneity.
The third prediction regards young firm dynamics in relation to initial worker composition:
Prediction 3. Young firms that have higher productivity or initially hire higher-ability workers are more
likely to survive and grow.
A notable feature of our model is the dependence of future firm productivity on initial work-
force ability, which shields young firms from cost shocks and gives rise to Prediction 3. Inferring
worker quality from data can be a difficult task absent precise human capital proxies. However,
through the lens of our model, worker pay fixed effects directly correspond to unobserved worker
ability. Consequently, the model suggests a positive relation between the permanent pay compo-
nent of a firm’s initial workforce and its future survival and growth prospects.
The fourth prediction concerns “worker selection” at young versus old firms:
Prediction 4. Young firms employ workers with lower ability on average.
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The worker selection described in Prediction 4 arises because, as a corollary of Prediction 3, the
unemployment pool will be skewed toward lower-ability workers. While surviving old firms on
average hired relatively high-ability workers in the past, young firms recruit exclusively from the
negatively selected unemployment pool, leading to a positive correlation between firm age and
average worker ability. Since most young firms hire low-ability workers who are permanently
low-paid, they may misleadingly appear to be low-paying in cross-sectional data.
The fifth prediction concerns “firm selection” over the life cycle of a firm:
Prediction 5. Young firms have lower productivity on average.
The firm selection described in Prediction 5 results from dynamic attrition as firms age. Since
the least productive among all young firms are most likely to exit when a cost shock materializes,
the pool of old firms consists of a positively selected subset of previously young firms. Because
most young firms have low productivity, one may erroneously confound the firm age-pay com-
ponent with permanent firm heterogeneity in the cross-section.
Altogether, the five key theoretical predictions call for an empirical specification with controls
for (unobserved) worker and firm heterogeneity in addition to firm age. Beyond these key pre-
dictions, the model is consistent with several other empirically relevant patterns, which we will
investigate in the data. First, if the initial distribution of job seekers is skewed toward low-ability
workers and most new business ideas are not productive, then the majority of young firms will
be low-paying and likely to exit. Second, if the unemployment pool composition is constant over
time, then there will be mean reversion in average workforce quality over a firm’s life cycle due
to repeated sampling of worker skills over time. Finally, we expect the young-firm pay premium
to be lower for workers with higher bargaining power, such as college graduates, and those in
industries with higher firm survival rates, such as workers in high-technology sectors.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data Description
Our analysis is made possible by combining two confidential databases from the US Census Bu-
reau. The first database contains employer-employee matched records including earnings infor-
mation, while the second database allows us to track businesses over their life cycle. The combined
dataset allows us to investigate the sources of pay differentials between young and old firms.
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Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics program (LEHD). Our analysis crucially relies
on the ability to track workers across firms over time. For this, we use restricted-use microdata
from the LEHD. Within covered states, this linked employer-employee dataset is constructed from
administrative unemployment insurance records of states participating in the program. The data
track nearly 100 percent of private employees across employers on a quarterly basis. Data cover-
age starts in 1990 for some states, while other states’ coverage begins later.
We have access to microdata for 31 states covering over 60 percent of US private sector employ-
ment, which translates into billions of observations over the data sample period.6 Our analysis of
such a large sample is subject to computational constraints on the Census’s administrative system,
leading us to seek an adequate sampling procedure. As we explain later, the estimation strategy
requires the inclusion of workers at firms that are connected through worker mobility. Instead of
randomly selecting workers across 31 states, which would skew our sample toward large firms
(Woodcock, 2005) and could exacerbate limited-mobility bias (Andrews et al., 2008), we restrict
attention to a representative subset of states, for which we keep the universe of all workers and
firms. Specifically, we sort all 50 states and the District of Columbia by the fraction of employ-
ment in firms up to three years old and choose the three states that land at the tenth, median, and
ninetieth percentiles: Vermont, Maryland, and Colorado.
This sampling procedure ensures that most observations within a state are included in the
connected set of workers. Including small firms is crucial for our analysis since most firms are
born small. For each individual, we record the logarithm of quarterly real earnings (or, in short,
“earnings”) at their current employer. Earnings data in the LEHD include all forms of compen-
sation that are immediately taxable. Stock options are typically taxed when exercised and at this
point appear in our earnings measure.7 Because our data do not contain information on equity
ownership, we do not separate between founders and nonfounders. Both are included in our data,
although most employees are nonfounders: the median new firm has six employees in our sample
but according to previous work has only two founders (Parker, 2009).8 The LEHD also allows us
to observe the age, gender, race, place of birth, and education of each employee.9
6See Abowd et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the LEHD program and the datasets generated from it. A map
showing the 31 states available in our data is contained in Figure 4 of Appendix B.
7The possibility that young firms offer additional remuneration not reported in administrative data, as documented
by Hurst et al. (2014), would further strengthen the main conclusions of our analysis. While there is some evidence that
larger firms offer greater fringe benefits such as pensions (Freeman, 1981; Brown and Medoff, 1989), which fall outside
of our income concept, our main conclusions are robust to controlling for firm size.
8Azoulay et al. (2018) identify founders as the highest earner at the time of firm birth. However, sorting on pay at
new firms is problematic in our empirical setting, given that our dependent variable is earnings.
9Education is imputed for employees with missing education data (Abowd et al., 2009) .
13
To construct our baseline sample, we start with all workers ever observed in one of the three
selected states. We retrieve these workers’ entire work histories in the LEHD from 1990 through
2006. We end our sample in 2006 to leave enough time to measure future firm outcomes. Earnings
are normalized to constant 2014 US dollars. As is standard in the literature, for each worker-
quarter combination, we keep the observations with the highest earnings. To limit the influence
of outliers, we drop observations with earnings growth exceeding 5,000 percent in a given year.
The LEHD data allow us to observe quarterly earnings with no information on weeks worked.
To account for the mechanical effect of job mobility within a quarter on earnings, we drop ob-
servations that do not have the same worker-firm pair in both the preceding and the subsequent
quarter. This adjustment is important, given that worker transitions between jobs not occurring at
the exact start of a new quarter would lead to a downward bias in earnings around a job change.
A potential downside of this adjustment is that we undersample workers with especially high
turnover rates, specifically those who switch jobs twice in two subsequent quarters. Furthermore,
to be consistent with previous work that uses annual income reports and to minimize the compu-
tational requirements of a large sample size, we retain only the first quarterly earnings report for
each worker-year combination.
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). Our analysis requires us to reliably identify firm age.
To this end, we supplement the LEHD data with firm-level information from the LBD. The LBD is
a panel dataset that tracks the universe of US business establishments with at least one paid em-
ployee (Jarmin and Miranda, 2002). An establishment is any separate physical location operated
by a firm with at least one paid employee. In addition, the LBD contains a unique firm-level iden-
tifier, which longitudinally links establishments that are part of the same firm. A representative
new firm in our sample will be an incorporated business with a few employees and a physical of-
fice location. This is distinct from the self-employed entrepreneurs who Hurst and Pugsley (2011,
2017) and Levine and Rubinstein (2017) argue have little desire to grow and are unlikely to cre-
ate economic benefits beyond themselves. The LBD contains information for all 50 US states and
the District of Columbia on the number of employees, total payroll, entry, exit, and age of the
establishment. Using the LBD has at two notable advantages.
First, the longitudinal linkage between establishments and their parent firm allows us to mea-
sure firm age. This is an important advantage over data that only allow us to infer establishment
age. The distinction between firm age and establishment age is quite important in our setting
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because the majority of new establishments are new branches of incumbent firms. A new estab-
lishment of an incumbent firm may resemble a more mature enterprise than the establishment
age would suggest. Following Haltiwanger et al. (2013), we define firm age using the oldest es-
tablishment that the firm owns in the first year the firm is observed in the LBD. As firm birth is
defined at the time of founding, we avoid misclassifying an establishment that changes ownership
as a newly born firm. Similarly, we track true firm age for companies that are legally acquired by
another company or those that change legal status.
Second, the full geographic coverage of the LBD allows us to measure firms’ total employ-
ment by summing employment levels at each of its establishments. Many outcomes of interest—
including entry, exit, and growth—are at the firm level rather than at the establishment level. But
this distinction is often hard to make in data that do not separately identify establishments from
firms (Schmieder, 2013).
3.2 Empirical Strategy
Motivated by our theoretical model in Section 2, we identify pay policies of young firms by aug-
menting the classical two-way fixed effects framework developed by AKM to allow firm pay poli-
cies to vary with firm age. We assume that earnings of individual i in year t at employer j = J (i.t)
are determined by the following equation:
yit = αi + ψJ(i,t) + ηt + Xitβ+ FirmAgeJ(i,t)tγ+ ε it, (2)
where yit denotes earnings, αi are worker fixed effects, ψJ(i,t) are firm fixed effects, ηt are year
fixed effects, Xit is a matrix of time-varying observable individual characteristics, FirmAgeJ(i,t)t
is a vector of indicators for firm age groups, and ε it is an error term. We are interested in the
coefficient vector γ on different firm-age groups. As a baseline, we will consider FirmAgeJ(i,t)t to
contain an indicator for firms up to three years old, which we will classify as “young firms,” while
other firms are classified as “old firms.” In alternative specifications, we vary this firm age cutoff
and also estimate a specification containing separate indicators for two-year bins between firm
birth and 20 or more years of age.
In equation (2), worker fixed effects capture the time-invariant component of pay due to in-
dividual heterogeneity rewarded proportionately across employers, which could be due to in-
nate ability and other individual characteristics. In comparison, firm fixed effects capture the
15
time-invariant component of pay due to employer heterogeneity awarded equally to all employ-
ees, which could be driven by differences in productivity, rent sharing agreements, or workplace
amenities. Abowd et al. (2002), Sorkin (2018), and Song et al. (2019) find significant between-firm
pay differentials for identical workers in the US labor market. Year fixed effects control for time-
varying changes in earnings common to all workers at a given point in time, including the mean
shift in earnings due to business cycle fluctuations. The set of time-varying worker controls, which
include squared and cubic terms of age interacted with education levels, capture skill-specific hu-
man capital accumulation over an individual’s lifetime.10
Building on the insight by Abowd et al. (2002), our augmented AKM specification is iden-
tified only within a set of firms and workers connected through worker transitions. The largest
connected set of workers in our data comprises the vast majority of worker-years and appears oth-
erwise similar to the complete data in terms of observable worker and firm characteristics. Worker
and firm effects are separately identified for observations contained in the (largest) connected set
by using the information on wage changes of workers moving between employers during the
sample period. Not all workers are required to move, but for each firm, at least one worker is
required to join from or else leave for another firm in the connected set.
By augmenting the standard AKM equation with an additional set of firm age controls, we
effectively allow for a common age effect in firm pay policies across employers. For the coeffi-
cients on firm age to be identified separately from the other AKM components, we require that
age buckets be connected through surviving firms. Identification of the age indicators cannot be
achieved if each firm is observed for only one period, as the firm fixed effect would then account
for all firm-pay variation. A sufficient condition for identification is for each age bucket below the
highest one to contain at least one firm that is observed after graduating into the next higher age
bucket. No further restriction on worker mobility between young and old firms is required.
As discussed in Schmieder (2013), identification of a linear firm age coefficient or more flexible
specifications is not possible in the presence of firm (cohort) fixed effects and time effects. There-
fore, it is not possible to include a fully flexible set of firm age dummies. Instead, we assume
that the firm-age-pay profile is flat after a certain cutoff firm age, which we vary between four
10Without further restrictions it is not possible to separately identify linear age effects in the presence of individual
(cohort) effects and year effects due to the well-known collinearity problem. Following Card et al. (2018), we omit
the linear age term and normalize the earnings profile to be flat around age 40 to obtain identification. Note that the
inclusion of worker fixed effects will subsume time-invariant worker controls such as education and gender. Similarly,
the inclusion of firm fixed effects will subsume time-invariant firm controls such as industry and state fixed effects.
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and 20 years.11 We later show that, consistent with this assumption, raw firm-pay profiles are
approximately flat after 20 years of age, with and without various controls.
We estimate equation (2) by ordinary least squares (OLS). To recover unbiased estimates of
worker and firm fixed effects, we require that the error term ε it satisfy a strict exogeneity condition:
E
[
ε it| αi,ψj, ηt, Xit, FirmAgeJ(i,t)t
]
= 0.
As shown by Card et al. (2013), a sufficient condition for this to hold under the usual assumptions
is that the assignment of workers across (young and old) firms obeys a strict exogeneity condition:
P [ J (i, t) = j| ε it] = P [J (i, t) = j] = Gjt
(
αi,
{
ψj
}
j
)
∀i, t.
This condition rules out “endogenous mobility” based on the error term ε it, including any match-
specific wage component. However, important for our application, this condition is entirely con-
sistent with worker mobility based on worker identity and the identity of all firms in the economy,
as captured by the function Gjt(αi, {ψj}j). That is, our OLS estimates of pay premia will not be
biased by systematic mobility of certain workers across certain (young and old) firms. Specifically,
equation (2) is consistent with, say, low-αi workers’ being disproportionately attracted to low-ψj
or young firms. To test for endogenous mobility, we employ a battery of tests proposed by Card
et al. (2013) and used in subsequent work by Card et al. (2016) and Alvarez et al. (2018).12
In a second step, we will relate future firm dynamics of employer j to their initial worker com-
position at firm birth. As we will shortly see, unobservable time-invariant worker heterogeneity,
which could be seen as a proxy for worker ability and human capital, will play an especially
important role in explaining cross-sectional pay differences. Consequently, we explore how the
initial workforce composition is related to future firm performance of firm j between its birth year
t and some future date t′ by running the following regression:
zjt′ = δ(αˆi)j + Zjtζ +ωjt′ , (3)
where zjt′ is a firm dynamics outcome, such as survival or employment, (αˆi)j is the mean estimated
11Schmieder (2013) follows a similar identification strategy, assuming that firm age-pay profiles are flat from age 30
onward. Technically, we also obtain identification of firm age effects separately from firm fixed effects and year effects
by grouping firm age into two-year intervals and assuming constant firm-age effects within those intervals.
12See Section 5.2 for an event-study analysis of pay changes in relation to worker mobility and invariance of our
results to different sources of worker transitions.
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AKM worker fixed effect among firm j’s initial workforce, Zjt is a vector of observable employer
characteristics, and ωjt′ is an error term. We are interested in estimates of the coefficient on the
mean worker fixed effect, δ, in equation (3). To the extent that worker fixed effects proxy for ability,
δ captures the relation between initial workforce quality and future business performance.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Our baseline sample is a panel of 48.4 million worker-year observations over 1990–2006. This
includes 7.1 million unique workers and 345,000 unique firms.13
To motivate our analysis, we plot average earnings of employees in our sample by two-year
bins from firm birth to 20 or more years of age in Panel A of Figure 1. Consistent with the find-
ings in Brown and Medoff (2003) from survey data, we document that employees at young firms
receive lower earnings as compared to employees at older firms. Specifically, employees at firms
0–1 years old have mean earnings almost USD 2,500 or 20 percent below the sample mean of USD
8,536. For intermediate groups, mean earnings grow monotonically with firm age.
An immediate suspicion is that low-paid workers at young firms may be compensated with
faster future earnings growth. To test for this, Panel B of Figure 1 plots the one-year earnings
growth rates for new hires as well as stayers, by employer age. Inspection of the figure shows a
nuanced pattern of mean wage growth across firm age groups. Earnings growth is close to the
sample mean of 4.6 percent for the subpopulation of firms up to three years old. Overall, the
variation in earnings growth rates as well as the gradient across firm age is rather small compared
to the large cross-sectional pay difference we document.
In Table 1, we report summary statistics for firms in Panel A and for workers in Panel B. Start-
ing with the firm-level analysis in Panel A, column 1 reports mean values and standard deviations
calculated across all firm-years in our sample. In column 2, we report statistics for old firms that
we define to be firms at least four years old. In column 3, we report the same statistics for young
firms, which are firms aged three years or less. As expected, new firms employ significantly
fewer workers, a median (mean) of 6 (15) employees compared to nearly 13 (210) employees at
old firms.14 In terms of observable worker composition, young and old firms employ a similar-
looking pool of employees. New firms are slightly more likely to employ male workers, with 54.5
percent of males compared to 52.8 percent males at old firms, and are less likely to employ college-
13All observation counts and estimates are rounded according to the US Census Bureau’s disclosure policies.
14In accordance with the US Census Bureau’s confidentiality rules, medians are calculated as the average over obser-
vations within the interquartile range.
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educated workers, with 32.3 percent compared to 36.4 percent of college-educated workers at old
firms. Altogether, the raw data suggest a large pay gap between young and old firms that is not
readily explained by worker composition based on observable worker attributes, leading us to
investigate the role of unobservable firm characteristics.
Turning to the worker-level analysis, column 1 in Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics
for all worker-years in our sample. Column 2 pertains to employees at old firms, while column
3 provides statistics for employees at young firms. We find that earnings are substantially lower
but earnings growth is essentially no greater at young firms relative to old firms. Employees
at young firms have lower mean tenure at 3.2 years compared to 5.9 years, but have a similar
representation of male and college-educated workers relative to old firms.15 While there are some
notable differences in observable worker attributes across young and old firms, this leaves room
for sorting on unobservable characteristics.
In Table 2, we report summary statistics separately for employees who ever move between
firms (column 2) and those who stay at the same firm throughout the sample period (column 1).
These statistics are informative of the observable attributes of job switchers, including those who
will start work at a new firm. Importantly, our identification strategy does not rely on movers
being similar to stayers in either observable or unobservable characteristics. However, we rely
on the identifying assumption that the expected gains from moving between firms are the same
for movers and stayers. Job movers tend to be younger, have less tenure, earn less, and have
higher earnings growth, consistent with findings in Topel and Ward (1992). During the 17-year
time window we study, most workers make at least one job transition, with job movers making
up 74 percent of all worker-year observations.
4 Pay and Dynamics of Young Firms
4.1 The Young-Firm Pay Premium
We now turn to the results from estimating the augmented AKM equation (2). Our focus is on
estimates of the coefficient γ on a young-firm indicator, which equals one for employers up to three
years of age.16 Guided by our theory in Section 2, we postulate that specifications without the full
15For this statistic only, we define tenure as the completed length of employment at the current firm, including future
employment. Hence, mean tenure may exceed young firms’ mean age, which is mechanically capped at three years.
16Our results are not sensitive to the exact definition of what constitutes a “young” firm. We find consistent results
when defining a young firm as being up to one year old (Table 11 in Appendix B) or using a more gradual definition of
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set of controls for unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity are misspecified, leading to biased
estimates of young firms’ pay policies. We uncover the true young-firm pay premium (if positive)
or penalty (if negative) by simultaneously controlling for both worker and firm heterogeneity.17
All standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and worker level.
We begin by estimating the young-firm pay premium with only year fixed effects as controls.
We then add worker fixed effects to control for time invariant worker heterogeneity. Next, we add
controls for time-varying worker characteristics to account for life cycle patterns in pay. In our
preferred specification, we add firm fixed effects to control for permanent firm heterogeneity. We
then repeat our estimates with additional controls for firm size. Finally, we repeat our estimates
while allowing for a more flexible firm age profile of pay.
Cross-Sectional Estimates. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that workers at young firms earn 30.7
log points less compared to those at old firms, suggesting a sizable pay penalty at young firms
consistent with the results in Brown and Medoff (2003) and Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014).
Controlling for Permanent Worker Heterogeneity. In column 2 of Table 3, we include worker
fixed effects to control for time-invariant worker characteristics by following individuals who
move across employers. As a result, the estimated pay penalty of young firms drops by more
than two-thirds of its original magnitude, to around 8.7 log points. We interpret this as young
firms’ disproportionately employing workers who are low paid regardless of where they are em-
ployed. For workers who switch between old and young firms, there is a sizable, yet significantly
smaller pay penalty than the cross-sectional comparison would suggest. We also note a dramatic
increase in the R2 of this regression, to 75 percent, suggesting that time-invariant worker traits
explain a sizable share of the earnings variation.
Additional Controls for Observable Worker Characteristics. In column 3 of Table 3, we add
controls for observable time-varying worker characteristics, including squared and cubic terms
of age interacted with education levels. Similar to our findings on young firms’ propensity to
hire workers with lower-paid time-invariant characteristics, we find that young firms also dispro-
firm age using two-year bins from birth to 20 or more years of age (Table 5).
17We follow Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2019) in presenting estimation results with sequentially added controls.
As is well-known, even under the assumption that earnings equation (2) is the true data-generating process, coefficient
estimates will remain biased when not all relevant controls are included. The size and direction of the bias will depend
on the covariance structure of the included and omitted variables.
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portionately employ workers with lower-paid time-varying observable characteristics. Indeed,
after controlling for time-invariant and time-varying worker characteristics, the young-firm pay
penalty is further reduced to 7.8 log points, while the R2 increases to 77 percent.
Additional Controls for Permanent Firm Heterogeneity. In column 4 of Table 3, we add firm
fixed effects to our previous specification. By simultaneously including worker and firm fixed
effects, we are effectively estimating an AKM equation, augmented with a control for firm age. As
a result of controlling for time-invariant characteristics by following workers and firms over time,
we estimate a moderate but statistically significant pay premium of 0.7 log points. Thus, a worker
who switches from an old firm to a young firm of otherwise identical characteristics experiences,
on average, a small increase in earnings. Adding controls for time-invariant firm characteristics
further increases the R2 to 81 percent.
Additional Controls for Firm Size. Most young firms are born small, with the median startup
employing six workers. Bartelsman et al. (2005) find that employer size varies systematically with
employer age in a sample of OECD countries. At the same time, there is ample variation in firm
size conditional on firm age (Pugsley et al., 2018). Related work has documented a positive firm
size-pay premium, even conditional on worker composition (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Idson and
Oi, 1999; Bloom et al., 2018). Furthermore, there is some evidence that larger firms offer hire fringe
benefits such as pensions (Freeman, 1981; Brown and Medoff, 1989), which fall outside of our
income concept. Consequently, one may wonder how our finding of a young-firm pay premium
is related to differentials in pay and benefits across small and large firms.
To distinguish between firm age and size, we add controls for firm employment to our base-
line specification in equation (2). Table 4 shows our estimation results. In column 1, controlling
only for firm size and year fixed effects, we find a negative and significant young-firm pay penalty
of 13.1 log points. The relatively smaller point estimate compared to our baseline result suggests
that the relation between firm size and earnings partly mediates the young-firm pay penalty. After
adding further controls for unobserved time-invariant worker heterogeneity (column 2), observ-
able worker attributes (column 3), and time-invariant firm heterogeneity (column 4), we confirm
that young firms pay a small but significant positive pay premium of around 1.7 log points.
Extension to Firm Age-Pay Profile. While the classification of firms into “young” and “old” is
a useful abstraction, it may seem natural to consider a specification that allows for a continuous
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firm age-pay profile (Haltiwanger et al., 2013). We pursue this by allocating all employers into
two-year bins based on firm age between birth and up to 18–19 years old, the omitted category is
firms 20 years or older. As the omitted category formerly consisted of firms at least four years old,
this leads to a change in interpretation of all coefficients in the current specification, which are now
relative to the reference group of mature firms at least 20 years old. Following an identification
strategy similar to Schmieder (2013) and discussed in greater detail in Section 3.2, we allow for
firms’ pay policies to vary flexibly across two-year bins for the first 20 years of firm age, assuming
that the firm pay policies remain constant thereafter.
Three key insights emerge from the results presented in Table 5. First, controlling for only
year fixed effects (column 1), workers at young firms are paid significantly less than those at older
firms, and earnings are monotonically increasing with firm age. For example, workers at firms
0–1 years old earn 19.8 log points less than those at firms 10–11 years old, and 38.2 log points less
than those at firms at least 20 years old.
Second, adding controls for permanent worker heterogeneity (column 2) and time-varying
observable worker heterogeneity (column 3) explains around two-thirds of the raw pay gap at
young firms. For example, the pay penalty relative to firms at least 20 years old decreases from
38.2 log points to 12.6 log points at firm age 0–1 and from 18.4 log points to 7.9 log points at firm
age 10–11 after accounting for worker heterogeneity (comparing columns 1 and 3).
Third, with a full set of controls including those for permanent firm heterogeneity, we find a
statistically significant young-firm pay premium, which is essentially monotonically decreasing
with firm age. For example, relative pay compared to firms with at least 20 years of age is 6.4 log
points higher at firms 0–1 years old and 2.7 log points at firms 10–11 years old.
Summary. It is well-known that workers at young firms have significantly lower earnings. How-
ever, we find that the bulk of the young-firm pay penalty is explained by young firms’ dispropor-
tionately hiring low-pay workers based on unobservable and observable characteristics. More-
over, young firms are more likely to be permanently low-paying relative to the pool of old firms.
Together, these two dimensions of selection explain essentially all of the young-firm pay penalty
in the raw data, turning it into a positive and significant young-firm pay premium.
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4.2 Initial Worker Composition Predicts Young-Firm Dynamics
In the previous section, we documented that young firms disproportionately hire low-paid work-
ers and that the bulk of young firms are permanently low-paying. In this section, we explore the
relation between firms’ initial worker composition and future survival and growth prospects. Our
theory in Section 2 suggests that the quality of the set of initial employees affects the dynamics of
young firms by imbuing in their organizational capital certain qualities of the initial worker pool.
This theory predicts that young firms that start out with initially high-ability workers are more
likely to survive and grow to old age.
We begin by providing descriptive evidence that initial worker composition matters for future
firm dynamics. We then test whether this suggestive evidence is robust to the inclusion of other
firm-level controls that may be related to future firm survival and employment.
Descriptive Evidence. As a first step, we compute for each firm the average AKM worker fixed
effect of its workforce, based on our main regression specification (see column 4 of Table 3). We
then tabulate the mean worker fixed effect for each two-year bins from birth to age 20 or greater,
shown in Panel A of Figure 2. Note that by construction, the average worker fixed effect across the
whole sample is zero. Related to our previous finding, we find that firms 0–1 years old employ
individuals who have, on average, almost 18 log points lower worker fixed effects than firms 10–
11 years old. Average worker fixed effects values increase in firm age up until 16–17 years old,
then start to decline again somewhat. This pattern could be consistent with either average worker
fixed effects increasing across firm age, or alternatively, the pool of older firms may be skewed
toward a subset of firms with relatively higher worker fixed effects.
Next, in Panel B of Figure 2, we show mean AKM worker fixed effects by two-year firm age
bins and whether the firm survives till 10 years of age. We find that surviving firms (green solid
bars) hire above-average worker fixed effect workers at birth. Among surviving firms, those 0–1
years old have worker fixed effects that are on average 5.8 log points higher than the population
average. Firms that exit within nine years of birth (red striped bars) hire individuals with below-
average worker fixed effect at birth. Among all dying firms, employers that are 0–1 years old have
worker fixed effects that are on average 18.9 log points lower than the population average. The
same figure demonstrates that the difference in mean worker fixed effects between surviving and
failing firms shrinks toward higher firm ages, possibly driven by the fact that the survival criterion
becomes less distinct conditional on higher firm age.
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Regression Analysis. Based on the descriptive evidence, we now formally examine whether
new firms’ initial worker composition predicts future survival and growth outcomes. To this end,
we project metrics of future firm dynamics on the mean AKM worker fixed effect of the initial
workforce at the time of a firm’s birth, while controlling for other relevant firm-level characteris-
tics. Specifically, we use as outcome variables an indicator for a young firm’s five-year exit rate
and the logarithm of five-year employment.18 In all regressions, we control for the logarithm of
initial firm employment, year of firm birth, state dummies, and industry fixed effects. In an addi-
tional set of regressions, we also control for firm-level moments of the distribution of observable
worker characteristics, including the logarithm of the mean years of education and the logarithm
of the mean age of all employees in the first year of firm birth.
Our baseline estimates in Table 6 (columns 1 and 3) show that initial worker composition,
through mean AKM worker fixed effects, is positively and significantly related to future firm
survival and employment growth.19 Moreover, the relationship is also economically significant.
Conditional on initial employment and observable worker characteristics (columns 2 and 4), a one
standard deviation increase in worker fixed effects is associated with a 9 percent higher survival
rate, relative to the mean survival rate of 42 percent, and 10 percent higher employment growth.
Summary. We find that initial worker composition, as measured by the average AKM worker
fixed effect, is significantly positively associated with future firm survival and employment. On
average, young firms are significantly more likely to hire low-pay workers. Also, as is well-known,
most young firms exit within few years of their formation. However, among firms that survive,
the initial workforce is skewed toward individuals with high fixed effects in earnings. Young
firms that hire more highly paid workers initially are less likely to exit and more likely to increase
in employment over the subsequent years.
4.3 Discussion
Through the lens of the theoretical model in Section 2, our empirical findings are informative
about the underlying selection of workers across young and old firms, about the selection of firms
over their life cycles, and the link between worker quality and firm dynamics. Combining theory
18We find similar results when using a logit specification to predict exit probabilities or when measuring exit after
four or six years instead of the five-year cutoff. We also find similar results when predicting future employment growth
in a restricted sample of surviving firms, so our results on employment growth are not driven by firm exit decisions.
19Since we control for the logarithm of initial firm employment, we interpret the coefficients on future employment
as capturing employment growth.
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and data, we briefly discuss some plausible economic interpretations of our empirical findings in
relation to structural determinants of worker and firm pay heterogeneity.
Our first main empirical finding is that young firms pay a positive pay premium relative to old
firms after controlling for worker and firm heterogeneity. Thus, we provide definitive evidence
from administrative data that extends earlier, tentative conclusions based on survey data that
worker characteristics explain part of the lower pay at younger firms in the US (Brown and Med-
off, 2003). That the cross-sectional young-firm pay penalty is largely explained by worker fixed
effects, and to some extent by observable worker characteristics, suggests that young firms dispro-
portionately hire low-ability workers (“worker selection”). That the young-firm pay penalty turns
into a positive pay premium after additionally controlling for firm fixed effects suggests that most
young firms have permanently low productivity (“firm selection”). Our model interprets this
pay premium as compensation for higher earnings risk at young firms due to higher firm exit risk,
consistent with the evidence by Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981), Diamond and Simon (1990), Mayo
and Murray (1991), and Moretti (2000). While our simple two-period model features only “young”
and “old” firms, we find that pay decreases gradually with firm age, consistent with the gradual
negative relation between firm exit risk and firm age in the data, as documented by Haltiwanger
et al. (2013).20
Alternatively, our first finding could also be consistent with the an upward-sloping labor sup-
ply curve, as in Schmieder (2013). This would be expected in an environment in which firm-level
labor supply elasticities are finite and a higher firm pay rank leads to greater recruiting intensity,
possibly due to monopsony power in the labor market (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Engbom and
Moser, 2018). This mechanism is absent from our simple theoretical model. Such a story seems
plausible for the parts of the economy for which a monopsony model provides a good description
of labor markets. Interestingly, as we demonstrate in Section 5.1, the young-firm pay premium
is smaller and statistically indistinguishable from zero for college-educated workers and those in
high-technology sectors. Our model can rationalize these observations as workers in those skill
groups and sectors have higher bargaining power (Cahuc et al., 2006) and face lower firm exit risk
(Agarwal and Gort, 1996, 2002).
20A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the 1.7 log points pay premium at young firms, with controls for
worker and firm heterogeneity including firm size, is of a reasonable magnitude given the extra unemployment risk
that working at a young firm entails. First, firms up to four years old, on average, have 5.0 percentage points higher
annual exit rates than older firms (Haltiwanger et al., 2013). Second, the mean duration of unemployment between
1990 and 2006 was around 16.0 weeks (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). Consequently, the expected foregone income
that we would expect young firms to compensate their workers for is around 1.5 percent (= 0.05× 16/52) per year.
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Our second main empirical finding is that young firms that initially hire more highly paid
workers are more likely to survive and grow in the future. While this empirical relationship need
not be causal, it is interesting to think about the fundamental economic forces giving rise to such
positive assortative matching. An often cited reason for the negative relation between firm age
and firm exit probability (Evans, 1987) is the low productivity of young exiting firms (Foster et
al., 2001, 2006). Our theory suggests a related but distinct explanation: the quality of young firms’
initial workforces. A notable feature of our model is that the average ability of the initial workforce
codetermines a young firm’s survival and growth prospects by helping it to absorb cost shocks and
by feeding into future firm productivity. While worker quality is sought after by everyone, in a
frictional labor market only some firms get lucky and hire a high-ability workforce. Therefore, our
findings contribute to a recent strand of literature arguing that business performance depends on
the quality of the CEO (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) and the entrepreneur (Parker, 2009).
An alternative interpretation of our second finding outside of our model would be that some
firms face inherently higher survival and growth prospects and as a result hire high-ability work-
ers, possibly due to production complementarities between worker and firm types. While our
results leave room for alternative stories of this kind, one would expect such a theory to imply
strong match components in labor demand and consequently pay, for which we find little evi-
dence (see Section 5.2). Instead, our findings contribute to a growing list of evidence that a log-
linear earnings specification, such as the one predicted by our model, provides a good fit to labor
market data from the US and other countries (AKM; Abowd et al., 1999b; Abowd et al., 2002; Card
et al., 2013; Card et al., 2016; Alvarez et al., 2018; Bonhomme et al., 2019). Our model, which de-
livers an earnings equation consistent with our empirical specification, provides a parsimonious
explanation for positive assortative matching and a rich set of other empirical patterns we docu-
ment. It is worth noting that in spite of the log-linearity of the wage equation, positive assortative
matching between high-ability workers and high-productivity firms emerges from our structural
model because of the notable feature that initial workforce quality feeds into firm productivity.
Our findings also speak to other, alternative explanations of the firm-age pay differential and
the link between initial workforce composition and business dynamics. Having demonstrated
that young firms pay a positive premium makes it no longer necessary to appeal to theories of
higher nonpay amenities at startups (Hamilton, 2000), differences in individual risk preferences
(Roach and Sauermann, 2015), backloaded tenure-pay profiles (Michelacci and Quadrini, 2009),
or household borrowing constraints (Dinlersoz et al., 2019) to rationalize observed employment
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patterns. After including relevant controls for worker and firm heterogeneity, no additional eco-
nomic justification is required to explain positive employment at young firms. If anything, our
findings suggest there is a positive pay premium at young firms, which our model interprets as
compensation for the expected cost of unemployment (Jacobson et al., 1993; Jarosch, 2015).
The results of our investigation lend no support to alternative interpretations of high AKM
worker fixed effects as representing worker who are “more expensive” or “overpaid,” possibly
because of their higher bargaining power. That young firms with higher average worker fixed
effects among their workforce are more likely to survive and grow is consistent with worker fixed
effects reflecting a sought-after worker quality such as ability, not just pure rent extraction.
Finally, our analysis points toward an interesting link between firm and worker characteris-
tics, which is closely related to the distinction between the quality of a business (“horse”) and its
founder (“jockey”) made by Kaplan et al. (2009). In contemporaneous work, Choi et al. (2019) em-
pirically test their hypothesize that organizational capital is embodied in an enterprise’s founding
members, by considering the premature deaths of those members. That firm quality is embedded
in human capital in their model is an interesting mechanism linking the fate of a firm and its work-
force. Conversely, in our model, initial workforce quality is embedded in firm productivity. Both
views are consistent with findings by Becker and Hvide (2017) and Choi et al. (2019) of a negative
effect of founding team member death on future business performance. Likewise in our model,
where recruiting is slow and costly, losing some of its initial workers would make a young firm
more prone to exit.
5 Robustness
In the previous section, we presented evidence that worker selection largely explains the young-
firm pay penalty and that firm selection explains it to a lesser extent. After controlling for dif-
ferences in permanent worker heterogeneity and permanent firm heterogeneity, we found that
young firms actually pay a positive premium relative to old firms. In this section, we provide
several robustness checks to corroborate this finding.
5.1 Alternative Samples
To probe the generality of our finding, we reestimate our main specification in equation (2) while
limiting the sample to subsets of high-skill workers. By focusing on certain proxies for ability, we
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implicitly test for the strength of selection on unobservables within more narrow skill groups.
College-Educated Workers. We start by looking at the subsample of college-educated workers,
defined as employees with sixteen or more years of education. The results in Table 7 show a
similar conclusion to that of the baseline sample of all workers. As for the overall sample, college-
educated workers earn significantly less at young firms compared to older employers, around
27.5 log points in magnitude (column 1). Controlling for permanent individual heterogeneity
through the addition of worker fixed effects (column 2) and time-varying worker characteristics
(column 3), the young-firm pay penalty is reduced by almost two-thirds, with a resulting estimate
of around 9 log points. Moreover, controlling for permanent employer heterogeneity by adding
firm fixed effects (column 4) delivers a precisely estimated zero pay difference between young
and old firms in this subsample. That pay at young firms is not significantly different from that at
old firms for college graduates is interesting and consistent with our model prediction, given that
college graduates have been shown to hold greater bargaining power (Cahuc et al., 2006).
College-Educated Workers in High-Technology Sectors. Next, we further restrict our subsam-
ple to college educated workers in high-technology sectors. We define high-technology sectors to
include Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes corresponding to computers, biotechnology,
electronics, and telecommunications. We assign each worker to an industry according to their first
employer’s SIC code in the data. As in our previous findings, the results in Table 8 show a sig-
nificant young-firm pay penalty of around 20.6 log points that goes to zero after adding controls
for worker and firm heterogeneity. That workers in these sectors are not paid a young-firm pay
premium is also consistent with our model prediction, given that technology-heavy businesses
have been shown to have higher survival rates (Agarwal and Gort, 1996, 2002).
5.2 Support for AKM Assumptions
In this section, we present a battery of robustness checks related to the augmented AKM specifi-
cation we employed in our main analysis. Following Card et al. (2013), we first provide empirical
support for the log-additive separability in the AKM earnings equation and evidence against en-
dogenous mobility based on drift or transitory components of the error term. We then provide
further evidence that our results are robust to different sources of mobility, including more plau-
sibly exogenous variation in workers’ propensity to move.
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A key concern in estimating an augmented AKM specification like equation (2) is that worker
mobility between (young and old) firms may be endogenous to the error term in earnings. To
investigate this, we write the error term, ε it, as the sum of three separate mean-zero components:
ε it = λi J(i,t) + µit + νit,
where λi J(i,t) is a worker-firm match-specific component, µit is a persistent unit-root component,
and νit is a transitory error component.
Match Effects. We first address the match component, λi J(i,t), which could derive from the clas-
sical Roy (1951) framework or a model of entrepreneurial selection as in Hvide and Oyer (2018).
In our setting, this could be problematic if workers joined a young firm based on a great personal
fit between the worker’s individual characteristics and those of the firm, beyond what is captured
by the worker- and firm-specific components αi and ψJ(i,t). If the majority of worker transitions
were guided by such match-specific considerations, then we would expect little systematic cor-
relation in gains for any two workers moving between the same firm pair. Conversely, absent
match-specific considerations, the relative earnings gains from moving between two firms would
be of the same magnitude and of the opposite sign as those from making the opposite move for
all workers.
We test for this symmetry by constructing an event-study analysis that examines the earnings
evolution around the time of switching employers. Specifically, we categorize employers into
quartiles based on mean coworker earnings. We then assign all workers to one of 16 groups based
on the quartiles of mean coworker earnings at the origin and destination firms around a move
between firms. For each of these 16 mover categories, we calculate mean earnings in the two years
before and after the job change.
Figure 3 plots a selection of the transitions from this event study. Panel XXX figure shows the
mean earnings profiles for workers leaving quartile 1 and quartile 4 employers for an employer in
the same or an adjacent category. The figure shows clear evidence that moving to a job with higher-
paid coworkers raises pay and vice versa. The bottom of the figure presents a similar event study
for workers switching between quartiles 1 and 4, with remarkable symmetry between the two
groups. The gains and losses for other mover categories exhibit a similar degree of symmetry.21
21Both subfigures show means of unadjusted earnings. In untabulated results, we find similar patterns when adjust-
ing earnings with age polynomials interacted with educational attainment.
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This symmetry suggests that a simple model with additive worker and firm effects but without
match effects provides a reasonable approximation of the average worker experience across firms
in the US labor market.
Drift and Transitory Shocks. We next address the possibility of endogenous worker mobility
based on the drift µit or transitory component νit of earnings . If a drift component of the error were
correlated with firm fixed effects, then job transitions would follow a systematic pattern of either
increasing or decreasing earnings at the prior employer. This would be the case, for example, in
learning models with comparative advantage (Gibbons, 2005) and models in which wages are set
under Bertrand competition (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Dey and Flinn, 2005). Under either
scenario, workers’ propensity to move would generally depend on their current drift component,
which would lead to biased estimates of the AKM earnings components. We find little evidence
of such patterns in the data. The event-study graphs in Figure 3 show not much of a differential
trend by switcher category around the time of transition. Similarly, we find little evidence of a dip
or a bump in earnings right around the time workers move between employer groups.
Sources of Mobility. Related to the endogenous mobility bias addressed above, a general con-
cern is that workers move as a function of the error term in earnings, ε it. Such moves would
appear relatively more likely after workers and firms have had ample opportunity to learn about
potential future match effects between them as well as between themselves and other potential
match partners. We proxy for the ability to learn about match effects with the reason a worker
left their previous employment. Specifically, we distinguish between movers whose previous em-
ployer exited and consequently had to lay off all its workers, those whose previous employer did
not exit, and those who joined a firm from no previous employment recorded in the data. Table
9 reports the resulting young-firm pay premium estimates for each subsample, first without firm
fixed effects (column 1) and then in our preferred specification with firm fixed effects (column 2).
Consistent with our identifying assumption of exogenous mobility, we find little evidence of a
differential young-firm pay premium across categories of movers.
5.3 Mean or Trend Pay Premium?
Given our finding of a positive young-firm pay premium after controlling for worker and firm
heterogeneity, one may wonder if this is the result of a differently sloped wage-tenure profile at
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young firms. For example, some theories predict that young and financially constrained firms
may provide relatively backloaded compensation in order to relax credit constraints (Michelacci
and Quadrini, 2009; Guiso et al., 2013). We address tenure effects in two ways.
First, we follow Schmieder (2013) in restricting our sample to only the first observation for
each worker-firm match. By dropping subsequent earnings observations, we effectively estimate
the young-firm starting-pay premium. This restriction reduces our sample size from around 48.4
million to 13.7 million observations. Table 9 shows results from estimating our main specification
in equation (2) with all controls other than firm fixed effects (column 5) and full controls including
firm fixed effects (column 6). Broadly consistent with our previous result, we find a slightly lower
young-firm pay penalty of 5.9 log points (compared to 7.8 log points previously) without firm
controls and a slightly higher young-firm pay premium of 2.6 log points (compared to 0.7 log
points previously) with firm controls.
Second, we estimate an extended specification with worker tenure dummies interacted with
a young-firm indicator, where young-firm status is defined as previously to include employers in
business up to three years old. For old firms, we include dummies for 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more years
of tenure. For young firms, we include dummies for 0, 1, 2, and 3 years of tenure. It is important to
note that tenure will be mechanically lower and capped at 3 years for workers at young firms. As
a result, this specification may confound worker-tenure heterogeneity across young and old firms
with young firm–specific firm age–pay profiles. For example, a worker transitioning from 0 to 1
year of tenure at a young firm will experience wage growth that may come from either a change
in the firm age–specific pay component or from the worker tenure–specific component specific
to young firms. It should be noted, however, that this is less of an issue in our specification that
includes a young-firm dummy, which is constant for the first three years of a firm’s life. With this
in mind, we estimate the same specification as in equation (2).
The estimated tenure profiles at young and old firms are reported in Table 10. Column 1
shows tenure profiles at old and young firms with only year fixed effect controls. We find positive
tenure-earnings relations at both old and young firms, although the profile is steeper at young
firms. Subsequent columns repeat estimates with additional controls for permanent worker het-
erogeneity (column 2), time-varying worker controls (column 3), and our preferred specification
with permanent firm heterogeneity (column 4). In the latter, we find a significant tenure-earnings
profile for workers at old and young firms. At old firms, pay increases monotonically up to 8.7
log points after three years of tenure, relative to zero tenure years. At young firms, zero-tenure
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workers start out earning 3.4 log points more than their counterparts at old firms but the relative
pay premium of young firms shrinks monotonically to 1.4 log points for workers with three years
of tenure. Consistent with our previous finding, these results suggest that young firms pay a small
premium at every tenure level, although they offer a less steep tenure-earnings profile compared
to old firms. Comparing columns 1 and 4, we conclude that the flatter tenure-earnings profile at
young firms is driven by worker and firm selection over time.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we take a theory-guided empirical approach to studying the sources of the young-
firm pay penalty in the data. Combining two confidential databases from the US Census Bureau,
we confirm earlier survey data evidence (Brown and Medoff, 2003) of lower earnings at young
firms by 30.7 log points. We then exploit the two-sided panel dimension of the data to separately
identify unobserved worker and firm pay components. Controlling for time-invariant and time-
varying worker and firm heterogeneity, we find a significant positive young-firm pay premium
of 0.7 log points (1.7 log points with additional firm size controls) at young firms. Our results
highlight the role of simultaneous worker and firm selection. We also show that worker selection
at firm birth is significantly related to future business dynamics, including firm survival rates and
employment growth. Finally, we tie our empirical findings to a simple model of pay, employment,
and dynamics of young firms.
Our findings definitively overturn conventional wisdom, based on previous evidence using
survey and employer-level data, that older employers pay more. Our findings also suggest that,
after including relevant controls for worker and firm heterogeneity, no additional economic justifi-
cation is required to explain positive employment at young firms. Instead, we draw three conclu-
sions. First, selection of heterogeneous workers across heterogeneous employers is of paramount
importance to understanding the pay structure across young and old firms. Second, selection of
highly paid workers into young firms is a strong predictor of future business success, although
the direction of causality remains an open question. Third, more extensive data infrastructure
along the lines of Davis et al. (2007) and Goetz et al. (2015) is needed and new theories of joint
worker and firm dynamics with two-sided heterogeneity should be developed in order to further
our understanding of important labor market outcomes.
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Figure 1. Mean Earnings and Average Earnings Growth by Firm Age
Figure shows mean worker earnings in Panel A and mean worker earnings growth in Panel B by
employer age of all worker-years in the baseline sample. The baseline sample is a worker-year
panel from 1990 through 2006. In Panel A, earnings are quarterly and normalized to real 2014
dollars. In Panel B, earnings growth is the log differences between the current and the previous
year’s quarterly earnings.
Panel A. Average Earnings
Panel B. Average Earnings Growth
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Figure 2. Mean Worker Fixed Effects by Firm Age and Survival Status
Figure shows mean of worker fixed effects by employer age for workers in the baseline sample.
The baseline sample is a worker-year panel from 1990 through 2006. Earnings are log normalized
to real 2014 dollars. Worker fixed effects are estimated from the baseline Earnings regression in
Table 3, column 4. Panel A reports the statistics for all worker-years from the baseline sample.
Panel B shows the statistics for a subsample of worker-years at firms that survive for at least ten
years (in green) and for a subsample of worker-years at firms that exit within nine years of firm
birth (in red).
Panel A. All Firms
Panel B. Surviving and Dying Firms
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Figure 3. Mean Earnings of Job Changers Classified by Quartile of Mean Earnings of Cowork-
ers at Origin and Destination Firm
Figure shows mean earnings of workers from the baseline sample who change employers in year
zero, and held the preceding job for two or more years (years -2 and -1), and the new job for two
or more years (years 1 and 2). The baseline sample is a worker-year panel from 1990 through
2006. Each job is classified into quartiles based on mean earnings of coworkers. Earnings are log
normalized to real 2014 dollars.
Panel A. Switchers from top and bottom quartiles
Panel B. Switchers between top and bottom quartiles
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Young and Old Firms
Panel A shows mean (standard deviation) statistics at the firm-year level, and Panel B at the
worker-year level for the baseline sample. The baseline sample is a worker-year panel from 1990
through 2006. Column 1 reports statistics using the sample of all firms. Column 2 (3) reports
statistics for old firms (young firms). Old firm is a firm four or more years old; young firm is a
firm three or fewer years old. In Panel A, workforce statistics are calculated at a unique firm-year
level in the following way: first, for a given variable, the average is calculated for each firm-year
across all workers employed by that firm-year; second, reported means and standard deviations
are calculated across firm-years.
Panel A. Firm-year level variables
(1) (2) (3)
All Firms Old Firms Young Firms
Firm Age 11.1 13.7 1.8
(8.1) (7.3) (1.0)
Firm Employment 167 210 14.6
(965) (1,084) (131)
Percent Male Employees 0.532 0.528 0.545
(0.330) (0.325) (0.349)
Percent College Educated Employees 0.355 0.364 0.323
(0.254) (0.246) (0.276)
Number of Observations (millions) 2.1 1.6 0.5
Panel B. Worker-year level variables
(1) (2) (3)
All Firms Old Firms Young Firms
Quarterly Earnings (2014$) 8,536 8,673 6,818
(7,602) (7,643) (6,839)
Earnings Growth 0.046 0.046 0.046
(0.485) (0.476) (0.582)
Tenure (years) 5.7 5.9 3.2
(4.4) (4.5) (2.7)
Age 38.7 38.9 36.0
(12.8) (12.7) (12.7)
Male 0.524 0.523 0.535
(0.499) (0.499) (0.498)
Education (years) 13.9 13.9 13.6
(2.6) (2.6) (2.5)
Number of Observations (millions) 48.4 44.8 3.6
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Workers Who Change and Do Not Change Employers
Table shows summary statistics for workers who never change employers in the sample (column
1) and change employers at least once (column 2) for the workers in the baseline sample. The
baseline sample is a worker-year panel from 1990 through 2006. Statistics are means, followed by
standard deviations in parentheses.
(1) (2)
Stayers Movers
Quarterly Earnings (2014$) 10,020 8,002
(8,905) (6,999)
Earnings Growth 0.018 0.056
(0.372) (0.519)
Tenure (years) 8.3 4.7
(5.3) (3.6)
Age 41.9 37.5
(13.4) (12.3)
Male 0.558 0.512
(0.496) (0.500)
Education (years) 14.2 13.8
(2.5) (2.6)
Number of Observations (millions) 12.8 35.6
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Table 3. Young-Firm Pay Premium Estimates for All Workers
Table reports baseline results of earnings at young firms. The baseline sample is a worker-year
panel from 1990 through 2006. In all columns, the dependent variable is the log of worker total
quarterly earnings. Earnings are in real 2014 dollars. Young firm is defined as a firm three or
fewer years old. Time-varying worker controls include worker age squared, worker age cubed,
worker age times education, worker age squared times education, worker age cubed times edu-
cation. Worker age is normalized by 40 and log transformed. Education is measured in years of
schooling and log transformed. Note, worker age and education are not included as linear con-
trols in regressions with worker fixed effects since they are collinear with the fixed effect. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm and the worker level, and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Young Firm -0.307*** -0.087*** -0.078*** 0.007***
(0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations (millions) 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4
R-squared 0.009 0.748 0.771 0.810
Time-Varying Worker Controls No No Yes Yes
Worker FE No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4. Young-Firm Pay Premium Estimates After Controlling for Firm Size
Table reports baseline results of earnings at young firms after controlling for firm size. The baseline
sample is a worker-year panel from 1990 through 2006. The baseline sample of workers which
consists of a worker-year panel from 1990 through 2006. In all columns, the dependent variable is
the log of worker total quarterly earnings. Earnings are in real 2014 dollars. Young firm is defined
as a firm three or fewer years old. Firm employment is log transformed. Time-varying worker
controls include worker age squared, worker age cubed, worker age times education, worker age
squared times education, worker age cubed times education. Worker age is normalized by 40
and log transformed. Education is measured as years of schooling and is log transformed. Note,
worker age and education are not included as linear controls in regressions with worker fixed
effects since they are collinear with the fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and
the worker level, and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Young Firm -0.131*** -0.014*** -0.008*** 0.017***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln(Firm Employment) -0.010 0.104*** 0.118*** 0.087***
(0.032) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Ln(Firm Employment)2 0.018*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.005**
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln(Firm Employment)3 -0.001*** -0.000 0.0002*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001)
Observations (millions) 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4
R-squared 0.040 0.750 0.775 0.810
Time-Varying Worker Controls No No Yes Yes
Worker FE No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5. Firm-Age Group Pay Estimates for All Workers
Table reports baseline results of earnings at firms of different ages. The sample is a worker-year
panel from 1990 through 2006. In all columns, the dependent variable is the log of worker total
quarterly earnings. Earnings are in real 2014 dollars. Worker controls include worker age squared
and age cubed, and their interactions with worker education. Time-varying worker controls in-
clude worker age squared, worker age cubed, worker age times education, worker age squared
times education, worker age cubed times education.Worker age is normalized by 40 and log trans-
formed. Education is measured in years of schooling and log transformed. Note, worker age and
education are not included as linear controls in regressions with worker fixed effects since they
are collinear with the fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and the worker level,
and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Age 0–1 -0.382*** -0.127*** -0.126*** 0.064***
(0.025) (0.005) (0.004) (0.014)
Firm Age 2–3 -0.387*** -0.138*** -0.140*** 0.042***
(0.025) (0.005) (0.004) (0.014)
Firm Age 4–5 -0.303*** -0.105*** -0.118*** 0.039***
(0.032) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014)
Firm Age 6–7 -0.258*** -0.089*** -0.105*** 0.032***
(0.030) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012)
Firm Age 8–9 -0.208*** -0.072*** -0.09*** 0.028***
(0.033) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)
Firm Age 10–11 -0.184*** -0.064*** -0.079*** 0.027***
(0.036) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010)
Firm Age 12–13 -0.157*** -0.052*** -0.064*** 0.028***
(0.039) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Firm Age 14–15 -0.128*** -0.035*** -0.049*** 0.025***
(0.035) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Firm Age 16–17 -0.081*** -0.016** -0.034*** 0.018***
(0.029) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Firm Age 18–19 -0.049* -0.011*** -0.025*** 0.009**
(0.025) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm Age 20+ (omit) (omit) (omit) (omit)
Observations (millions) 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4
R-squared 0.018 0.748 0.771 0.810
Time-Varying Worker Controls No No Yes Yes
Worker FE No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6. Young-Firm Dynamics as a Function of Initial Worker Composition
Table shows cross-sectional OLS results from predicting young firm exit (columns 1–2) and fu-
ture employment (columns 3–4) as a function of worker fixed effects estimated from the earnings
regression in Table 3, column 4. The sample is a cross-section of young firms from the baseline
sample. The baseline sample is a worker-year panel from 1990 through 2006. In columns 1–2, the
dependent variable, Young Firm Exits in 5 Years, equals one for young firms that exit by year five
since founding. In columns 3–4, the dependent variable, Young Firm 5-year Employment, is the
log of a young firm’s employment at age five. Mean Worker Fixed Effects is the mean of worker
fixed effects of workers at the young firm in its first year of existence. State FE and Industry FE
refer to the industry of the young firm. Industry fixed effects are at the SIC-3 digit level. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level, and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Young Firm Ln(Young Firm
Exits in 5 Years Employment in 5 Years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Worker Fixed Effects -0.063*** -0.054*** 0.120*** 0.145***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations (thousands) 205 205 205 205
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.098 0.099
Log Young Firm Employment in First Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Mean Worker Education in First Year No Yes No Yes
Log Mean Worker Age in First Year No Yes No Yes
Year of Firm Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7. Young-Firm Pay Premium Estimates for College-Educated Workers
Table shows results from regressions of worker earnings on the young firm indicator variable for
college-educated workers from our baseline sample. The baseline sample is a worker-year panel
from 1990 through 2006. In all columns, the dependent variable is the log of worker total quarterly
earnings. Earnings are in real 2014 dollars. Young firm is defined as a firm three or fewer years
old. Time-varying worker controls include worker age squared, worker age cubed, worker age
times education, worker age squared times education, worker age cubed times education. Worker
age is normalized by 40 and log transformed. Education is measured in years of schooling and
log transformed. Note, worker age and education are not included as linear controls in regres-
sions with worker fixed effects since they are collinear with the fixed effect. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm and the worker level, and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Young Firm -0.275*** -0.092*** -0.089*** 0.001
(0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations (millions) 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3
R-squared 0.008 0.751 0.762 0.809
Time-Varying Worker Controls No No Yes Yes
Worker FE No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8. Young-Firm Pay Premium Estimates for College-Educated Workers in High-
Technology Sectors
Table shows results from regressions of worker earnings on the young firm indicator variable
for college-educated workers in high-technology sector from our baseline sample. The baseline
sample is a worker-year panel from 1990 through 2006. In all columns, the dependent variable is
the log of worker total quarterly earnings. Earnings are in real 2014 dollars. Young firm is defined
as a firm three or fewer years old. Time-varying worker controls include worker age squared,
worker age cubed, worker age times education, worker age squared times education, worker
age cubed times education. Worker age is normalized by 40 and log transformed. Education is
measured in years of schooling and log transformed. Note, worker age and education are not
included as linear controls in regressions with worker fixed effects since they are collinear with
the fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and the worker level, and reported in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Young Firm -0.206*** -0.095*** -0.091*** 0.005
(0.027) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations (millions) 6.29 6.29 6.29 6.29
R-squared 0.014 0.724 0.738 0.804
Time-Varying Worker Controls No No Yes Yes
Worker FE No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 10. Robustness: Young-Firm Tenure–Pay Profile Estimates
Table reports results of earnings by worker tenure at an employer and by the employer’s age. The
sample is a worker-year panel from 1990 through 2006. In all columns, the dependent variable is
the log of worker total quarterly earnings. Earnings are in real 2014 dollars. Tenure 1 (2) (3) (4+)
equals one for workers who were at the employer for one (two) (three) (four or more) years. Young
firm is defined as a firm three or fewer years old. Worker controls include worker age squared and
age cubed, and their interactions with worker education. Worker age is normalized by 40 and log
transformed. Education is measured in years of schooling and log transformed. Note, worker age
and education are not included as linear controls in regressions with worker fixed effects since
they are collinear with the fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and the worker
level, and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Year of Tenure 0.165*** 0.041*** 0.011*** 0.008***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
2 Years of Tenure 0.370*** 0.109*** 0.064*** 0.062***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
3 Years of Tenure 0.477*** 0.128*** 0.083*** 0.087***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
4+ Years of Tenure 0.686*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.133***
(0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
0 Years of Tenure * Young Firm -0.086*** -0.050*** -0.047*** 0.034***
(0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
1 Year of Tenure * Young Firm -0.087*** -0.058*** -0.049*** 0.027***
(0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
2 Years of Tenure * Young Firm -0.071*** -0.059*** -0.044*** 0.026***
(0.016) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0024)
3 Years of Tenure * Young Firm -0.030 -0.064*** -0.040*** 0.014***
(0.019) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations (millions) 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4
R-squared 0.079 0.749 0.772 0.811
Time-Varying Worker Controls No No Yes Yes
Worker FE No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
51
A Model Appendix
Details on Pay Determination. The bargagining problem between a worker with ability θ and a
firm with productivity p and age a is
wt (θ, p, a) = arg max
w
Ct (w; θ, p, a)
β Jt (w; θ, p, a)
1−β .
Then the surplus function for young firms can be written
Jt(w; θ, p, young) = (1− xt (p, {lθ}θ)) (pθ − w) lθ ,
while for old firms the surplus function is
Jt(w; θ, p, old) = (pθ − w) lθ .
Note that in formulating the surplus function for old firms, we exploited the linearity of the pro-
duction function, which allows us to solve the bargaining problem separately by worker type.
The surplus function for workers joining at a young firm is then
Ct(w; θ, p, young) = (1− xt (p, {lθ}θ))w− bθ,
while that for workers remaining at or joining old firms is
Ct(w; θ, p, old) = w− bθ.
Bargaining Solution. First, note that we can rewrite the bargaining program in logarithms as
wt (θ, p, a) = arg max
w
β ln [Ct (w; θ, p, a)] + (1− β) ln [Jt (w; θ, p, a)] .
For young firms, the bargaining problem becomes
wt (θ, p, young) = arg max
w
 β ln [(1− xt (p, {lθ}θ))w− bθ] + (1− β) ln [pθ − w]+ (1− β) ln [(1− xt (p, {lθ}θ)) lθ ]
 ,
52
with associated FOC
β (1− xt (p, {lθ}θ))
(1− xt (p, {lθ}θ))w− bθ
− 1− β
pθ − w = 0.
Solving this, we find the bargained earnings at young firms to be
wt (θ, p, young) = βpθ +
(1− β) bθ
1− xt (p, {lθ}θ)
. (4)
For old firms, the bargaining problem becomes
wt (θ, p, old) = arg max
w
β ln [w− bθ] + (1− β) ln [pθ − w] + (1− β) ln [lθ ] ,
with associated FOC
β
w− bθ −
1− β
pθ − w = 0.
Solving this, we find the bargained earnings at young firms to be
wt (θ, p, old) = βpθ + (1− β) bθ. (5)
Young-Firm Pay Premium. Comparing bargained earnings for young firms in equation (4) and
old firms in equation (5), we see that wt (θ, p, young) > wt (θ, p, old)whenever β < 1 and x (p, {lθ}θ) >
0 for all p. In other words, young firms pay a premium over otherwise identical old firms.
Relation to AKM Earnings Equation. Finally, taking logs of equations (4) and (5), we see that
earnings in the model are log-separable between a worker component, a firm component, and a
component specific to employer age:
ln (wt (θ, p, young)) = ln (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
"worker fixed effect"
+ ln (βp + (1− β) b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
"firm fixed effect"
+ ln
 βp + (1−β)b1−xt(p,{lθ}θ)
βp + (1− β) b

︸ ︷︷ ︸
"young-firm pay premium"
ln (wt (θ, p, old)) = ln (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
"worker fixed effect"
+ ln (βp + (1− β) b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
"firm fixed effect"
Firm Exit Threshold. At the point when the fixed cost shock is realized, the firm weighs the
value of continuing operations in the current and next period against the value of exiting, which
is normalized to zero. Clearly, for large enough cost shocks it will always be optimal to exit.
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Conversely, for low enough fixed costs, firms must optimally decide to stay, or else their entry
and hiring decision cannot have been optimal. It is straightforward to see that the optimal exit
policy must follow a threshold rule: there exists a cost cutoff function c(p1, {lθ}θ) that depends
on firm productivity and initial worker composition such that the firm decides to stay for fixed
cost realizations below the threshold, c ≤ c(p1, {lθ}θ), while the firm decides to exit for fixed cost
realizations above the threshold, c > c(p1, {lθ}θ).
Relation Between Firm Productivity and Firm Survival. Since current and future profits are
strictly increasing in firm productivity p, the threshold function inherits the same property. There-
fore, more-productive firms have a higher exit threshold compared to less-productive firms:
∂c(p1, {lθ}θ)
∂p
> 0.
Consequently, for a fixed distribution of fixed cost shocks across firm productivity levels, the prob-
ability of firm exit is decreasing in firm probability:
∂x(p1, {lθ}θ)
∂p

< 0 whenever dO(c(p1,{lθ}θ))dc > 0.
= 0 otherwise
Note that the inequality is strict whenever there is a positive probability of a cost shock at the
point that defines the exit threshold for the current productivity.
Impact of Initial Worker Composition on Firm Survival and Growth. Recall that the average
ability of a firm’s initial workforce, θ, affects its future productivity p2(p1, θ),which is strictly in-
creasing in both its arguments. Given that higher θ implies higher p2 and the value of not exiting
is clearly increasing in p2, then a higher θ also implies a lower firm exit rate. Furthermore, con-
ditional on firm survival, a higher value of p2 together with the convex increasing nature of φ(v)
implies that the optimal vacancy posting amount in period 2 will be higher as well. As a result
of the linearity of new hires in the number of individual vacancies, higher p2 then implies higher
firm size in period 2. Conditional on current firm size in period 1, therefore, higher θ implies
higher firm growth in the future.
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B Empirical Appendix
Figure 4. Map of US States Available in the LEHD
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Table 11. Robustness: Defining Young Firms as Age 0–1
Table reports baseline results of earnings at young firms, where young firm is defined as younger
than two years. The sample is a worker-year panel from 1990 through 2006. In all columns, the
dependent variable is the log of worker total quarterly earnings. Earnings are in real 2014 dollars.
Time-varying worker controls include worker age squared, worker age cubed, worker age times
education, worker age squared times education, worker age cubed times education. Worker age
is normalized by 40 and log transformed. Education is measured in years of schooling and log
transformed. Note, worker age and education are not included as linear controls in regressions
with worker fixed effects since they are collinear with the fixed effect. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the firm and the worker level, and reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Young Firm (Age 0-1) -0.290*** -0.065*** -0.056*** 0.021***
(0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations (millions) 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4
R-squared 0.005 0.748 0.770 0.810
Time-Varying Worker Controls No No Yes Yes
Worker FE No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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